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Abstract. From 23.08. to 27.08.2009, the Dagstuhl Seminar 09351 In-
formation processing, rational belief change and social interaction  was
held in Schloss Dagstuhl  Leibniz Center for Informatics. During the
seminar, several participants presented their current research, and on-
going work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presen-
tations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results
and ideas are put together in this paper. The ﬁrst section describes the
seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full
papers are provided, if available.
Keywords. Social software, belief revision, conditionals, social choice,
game theory, contraction, update, argumentation, preference aggrega-
tion, agency, information
09351 Executive Summary  Information processing,
rational belief change and social interaction
From August 23, 2009 to August 27, 2009, the Dagstuhl Seminar 09351 "Infor-
mation processing, rational belief change and social interaction" was held at the
International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During
the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing
work and open problems were discussed.
Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of
seminar results and ideas are put together in these Proceedings. The Executive
Summary describes the seminar topics and goals in general and contains the
program of the workshop.
Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available.
Keywords: Social software, belief revision, conditionals, social choice, game
theory, contraction, update, argumentation, preference aggregation, agency, in-
formation
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BMS revisited
Guillaume Aucher (University of Luxembourg, LU)
The insight of the BMS logical framework (proposed by Baltag, Moss and Solecki)
is to represent how an event is perceived by several agents very similarly to the
way one represents how a static situation is perceived by them: by means of a
Kripke model. There are however some diﬀerences between the deﬁnitions of an
epistemic model (representing the static situation) and an event model. In this
paper we restore the symmetry.
The resulting logical framework allows to express statements about ongoing
events and to model the fact that our perception of events (and not only of the
static situation) can also be updated due to other events. We axiomatize it and
prove its decidability. Finally, we show that it embeds the BMS one if we add
common belief operators.
Keywords: Dynamic epistemic logic
Full Paper:
http://aucher.gforge.uni.lu/TARK2009BIS.PDF
See also: Guillaume Aucher: BMS revisited. TARK 2009: 24-33
The statics of rule update
Alexander Bochman (Holon Academic Inst. of Techn., IL)
We argue that there is an essential diﬀerence between the dynamics of factual
belief change and the process of rule update, so the traditional models of belief
update are inappropriate for the latter. Instead, the process of rule update ought
to be represented in a static framework of a prioritized system of rules. Some of
the principal questions and problems arising under this view are discussed.
Keywords: Rule update, belief update, priorotisation, nonmonotnic reasoning
Revealed preference, iterated belief revision and dynamic
games
Giacomo Bonanno (Univ. of California at Davis, US)
In previous work (G. Bonanno, Rational choice and AGM belief revision, Artiﬁ-
cial Intelligence, 2009) a semantics for AGM belief revision was proposed based
on choice frames, borrowed from the rational choice literature.
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In this paper we discuss how to use choice frames to analyze extensive-form
games. Given an extensive form with perfect recall, a choice frame can be used
to represent a player's initial beliefs and her disposition to change those beliefs
when she is informed that it is her turn to move. When some players move more
than once along some play of the game, the issue of iterated belief revision arises.
We provide a semantics for iterated belief revision in terms of choice frames and
provide an outline of how to use choice frames to analyze solution concepts for
extensive-form games.
Keywords: Choice function, AGM belief revision, extensive-form game, iterated
belief revision
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/2232
Argumentation Context Systems: A Framework for
Abstract Group Argumentation
Gerhard Brewka (Universität Leipzig, DE)
We introduce a modular framework for distributed abstract argumentation where
the argumentation context, that is information about preferences among argu-
ments, values, validity, reasoning mode (skeptical vs. credulous) and even the
chosen semantics can be explicitly represented. The framework consists of a
collection of abstract argument systems connected via mediators. Each media-
tor integrates information coming from connected argument systems (thereby
handling conﬂicts within this information) and provides the context used in a
particular argumentation module. The framework can be used in diﬀerent direc-
tions; e.g., for hierarchic argumentation as typically found in legal reasoning, or
to model group argumentation processes.
See also: E. Erdem, F. Lin, and T. Schaub (Eds.): LPNMR 2009, LNCS 5753,
pp. 44-57, 2009
Deontic Epistemic stit Logic Distinguishing Modes of
'Mens Rea'
Jan M. Broersen (Utrecht University, NL)
Most juridical systems contain the principle that an act is only unlawful if the
agent conducting the act has a `guilty mind' (`mens rea'). Diﬀerent law systems
distinguish diﬀerent modes of mens rea. For instance, American law distinguishes
between `knowingly' performing a criminal act, `recklessness', `strict liability',
etc. I will show we can formalize several of these categories. The formalism I
use is a complete stit-logic featuring operators for stit-actions taking eﬀect in
`next' states, S5-knowledge operators and SDL-type obligation operators. The
diﬀerent modes of `mens rea' correspond to the violation conditions of diﬀerent
types of obligation deﬁnable in the logic.
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Keywords: Product update, agency, stit theory, knowingly doing
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/2229
Interpreting Product Update as Reasoning about
Observations and Meta-Observations
Jan M. Broersen (Utrecht University, NL)
In this brief note, I would like to suggest that it makes sense to reinterpret prod-
uct update, as introduced by Baltag, Moss and Solecki, as a system to account
for observations and metaobservations, where a meta-observation is an observa-
tion of an observation. Under this interpretation we also take products of action
models with meta-action models. I deliberate on some possible consequences of
this extension to the interpretation of product update.
Keywords: Product update, agency, stit theory, knowingly doing
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/2233
A semantics for conditional assertions
John Cantwell (KTH Stockholm, SE)
I propose a semantics for conditionals based on a semantic version of the Ramsey
Test:
"If A, then B" is true if and only if B is true on the assumption that A.
This presupposes a semantics for conditional assertions. The resulting logic is
completely axiomatized revealing a logic with some interesting properties (e.g.
the import-export rule is validated). I also show how the semantics explains
some puzzling phenomena when modalities occur in the consequent of a condi-
tional, and how seemingly inherently 'conditional' modalities, such as conditional
probabilities and conditional obligations can be decomposed into a conditional
component and a categorical component.
Keywords: Conditionals, conditional assertions, conditional probabilities, con-
ditional obligations
Revising with Several Formulas
James Delgrande (Simon Fraser University - Burnaby, CA)
A recalcitrant problem in approaches to iterated belief revision is that, after ﬁrst
revising by a formula and then by a formula that is inconsistent with the ﬁrst
formula, all information in the original formula is lost.
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As noted by various researchers, this phenomenon is made explicit in the
second postulate (C2) of the well-known Darwiche-Pearl framework, and so this
postulate has been a point of criticism of this and related approaches.
In contrast, we argue that the true culprit of this problem arises from a
basic assumption of the AGM framework, that new information is necessarily
represented by a single formula. We propose a more general framework for belief
revision (called parallel belief revision) in which individual items of new infor-
mation are represented by a set of formulas. In this framework, if one revises
by a set of formulas, and then by the negation of some members of this set,
then other members of the set are still believed after the revision. Hence the
aforecited problem is discharged. We present ﬁrst a basic approach to parallel
belief revision, and next an approach that combines the basic approach with
that of Jin and Thielscher. Postulates and semantic conditions characterizing
these approaches are given, and representation results provided. We conclude by
using the approach to re-examine basic assumptions underlying iterated belief
revision.
Meta-epistemic logic: A simple modal logic for reasoning
about revealed beliefs
Didier Dubois (Université Paul Sabatier (IRIT) - Toulouse, FR)
Even though in Artiﬁcial Intelligence, a set of formulas in classical logic is often
called a belief base, reasoning about beliefs requires more than the language of
classical logic. This paper proposes a simple logic whose atoms are beliefs and
formulas are conjunctions, disjunctions and negations of beliefs. It enables an
agent to reason about some beliefs of another agent as revealed by the latter.
This logic, called MEL, borrows its axioms from the modal logic KD, but it is
an encapsulation of propositional logic rather than an extension thereof. MEL
bears some closer formal connection with Pauly's consensus logic. Its semantics
is in terms of subsets of interpretations, and the models of a formula in MEL is
a family of subsets of interpretations. It captures the idea that if the epistemic
state of an agent about the world is represented by a subset of possible worlds,
the meta-epistemic state of another agent about the former's epistemic state is a
family of such subsets. We prove that any family of subsets of interpretations can
be expressed as a single formula inMEL. This formula is a symbolic counterpart
of the Möbius transform in the theory of belief functions.
Keywords: Belief, incomplete information, epistemic state, modality, Moebius
transform
Joint work of: Mohua, Banerjee; Dubois, Didier
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Systematic judgment aggregators: An algebraic connection
between social and logical structure
Daniel Eckert (Universität Graz, AT)
We present several results that show that systematic (complete) judgment ag-
gregators can be viewed as both (2-valued) Boolean homomorphisms and as
syntatic versions of reduced (ultra)products. Thereby, Arrovian judgment ag-
gregators link the Boolean algebraic structures of (i) the set of coalitions (ii)
the agenda, and (iii) the set of truth values of collective judgments. Since ﬁl-
ters arise naturally in the context of Boolean algebras, these ﬁndings provide an
explanation for the extraordinary eﬀectiveness of the ﬁlter method in abstract
aggregation theory.
Keywords: Judgment aggregation, social structure, Boolean homorphism, ul-
traproduct
Joint work of: Eckert, Daniel; Herzberg, Frederik
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/2230
Speech acts as announcements
Andreas Herzig (Université Paul Sabatier (IRIT) - Toulouse, FR)
Our aim is to use the logic of public announcements and more generally dynamic
epistemic logics as a logic of speech acts. To that end we start from a simple
multimodal logic of beliefs and goals (without common belief), and add pub-
lic announcements. We suppose that announcements do not modify goals. We
then consider several variants of speech acts of assertive and directive force and
provide a modelling in terms of speech acts.
Keywords: Logic of belief, logic of goals, speech act theory, dynamic epistemic
logic, public announcements
Joint work of: Guiraud, Nadine; Herzig, Andreas; Lorini, Emiliano
(Iterated) Revision and Update, Revisited
Gabriele Kern-Isberner (TU Dortmund, DE)
In this talk, belief change is investigated within an abstract framework of epis-
temic states and sets of conditional beliefs.
Information processing, rational belief change and social interaction 7
This goes far beyond the well-known AGM or KM frameworks, but we ar-
gue that change operations in such rich epistemic frameworks allow for a more
accurate view on belief change from which consequences for classical belief re-
vision and update might be derived. In particular, our approach makes revision
and update two diﬀerent instances of a basic epistemic change operator which
takes a prior epistemic state and a set of conditional beliefs as input and returns
a posterior epistemic state. In this way, we shed light both on parallels and
on diﬀerences between revision and update. Furthermore, we propose a (ﬁrst)
approach how to take knowledge on actions and observations into account as
well that implements a close connection between actions and update, on the one
hand, and observations and revision, on the other. We use a well-known example
to illustrate that even in more complicated cases, proper results can be obtained
quite easily.
Keywords: Belief revision, belief update, ordinal conditional functions, actions
Improvement Operators
Sebastien Konieczny (Université d'Artois - Lens, FR)
We introduce a new class of change operators. They are a generalization of
usual iterated belief revision operators. The idea is to relax the success property,
so the new information is not necessarily believed after the improvement. But
its plausibility has increased in the epistemic state. So, iterating the process
suﬃciently many times, the new information will be ﬁnally believed. We give
syntactical and semantical characterizations of these operators.
Keywords: Belief Revision, Iteration
Joint work of: Konieczny, Sebastien; Pino-Perez, Ramon
Preference change triggered by belief change: a principled
approach
Jerome Lang (CNRS - Paris, FR)
Various tasks need to consider preferences in a dynamic way. To evaluate and
classify methods for preference change, we introduce eight properties for prefer-
ences evolving after some new fact has been learned.
Four properties are concerned with persistence of preferences when something
being preferred is (partly) satisﬁed or dissatisﬁed, and formalize that preference
change indicates that the ideal state has not been reached or has become un-
reachable.
Four other properties are concerned with persistence of preferences when,
roughly, the agent learns something she already expected to hold, and formalizes
that preference change is due to surprise.
8 Giacomo Bonanno, James Delgrande and Hans Rott
We deﬁne a family of preference change operators, parameterized by a re-
vision function on epistemic states and a semantics for interpreting preferences
over formulas, and we give conditions on the revision function and the semantics
of preference for each of the eight conditions to hold.
Joint work of: Lang, Jerome; van der Torre, Leon
Epistemic Games in Modal Logic: Joint Actions,
Knowledge and Preferences all together
Emiliano Lorini (Université Paul Sabatier (IRIT) - Toulouse, FR)
We present in this work a sound and complete modal logic called EDLA (Epis-
temic Dynamic Logic of Agency) integrating the concepts of joint action, prefer-
ence and knowledge and enabling to reason about epistemic games in strategic
form. We provide complexity results for EDLA. In the second part of the paper,
we study in EDLA the epistemic and rationality conditions of some classical
solution concepts like Nash equilibrium and Iterated Deletion of Strictly Domi-
nated Strategies (IDSDS). In the last part of the paper we combine EDLA with
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) in order to model epistemic game dynamics.
Keywords: Modal logic, game theory, epistemic games
Joint work of: Lorini, Emiliano; Schwarzentruber, François; Herzig, Andreas
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/2231
Next steps in propositional Horn contraction
Thomas Meyer (Meraka Institute - Pretoria, ZA)
Standard belief contraction assumes an underlying logic containing full classical
propositional logic, but there are good reasons for considering contraction in less
expressive logics. In this paper we focus on Horn logic. In addition to being of
interest in its own right, our choice is motivated by the use of Horn logic in sev-
eral areas, including ontology reasoning in description logics. We consider three
versions of contraction: entailment-based and inconsistency-based contraction
(e-contraction and i-contraction, resp.), introduced by Delgrande for Horn logic,
and package contractio (p-contraction), studied by Fuhrmann and Hansson for
the classical case. We show that the standard basic form of contraction, partial
meet, is too strong in the Horn case. We deﬁne more appropriate notions of
basic contraction for all three types above, and provide associated representa-
tion results in terms of postulates. Our results stand in contrast to Delgrande's
conjectures that orderly maxichoice is the appropriate contraction for both e-
and i-contraction. Our interest in p-contraction stems from its relationship with
an important reasoning task in ontological reasoning: repairing the subsump-
tion hierarchy in EL. This is closely related to p-contraction with sets of basic
Horn clauses. We show that this restricted version of p-contraction can also be
represented as i-contraction.
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Keywords: Belief contraction, Horn logic
Joint work of: Meyer, Thomas; Richard Booth, Ivan Varzinczak
See also: Richard Booth, Thomas Meyer and Ivan José Varzinczak. Next Steps
in Propositional Horn Contraction. In Craig Boutilier ed., Proceedings of IJCAI
2009: Twenty-First International Joint Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence, 702-
707, AAAI Press, 2009.
Two Approaches to Iterated Belief Contraction
Abhaya Nayak (Macquarie University - Sydney, AU)
Iterated Belief Contraction is a relatively less explored area in belief change and
intuition for it is often driven by work in the area of iterated belief revision.
One of the inﬂuential approaches to iterated belief revision is natural revision
propounded by Craig Boutilier. In a recent work a corresponding account of nat-
ural contraction was outlined by Nayak and his colleagues. Another approach to
iterated contraction outlined in their work is Priority Contraction. In this work
we show that both of these contraction functions satisfy the Principled Fac-
tored Insertion. Furthermore, we characterize them via some simple properties
of iterated contraction.
Keywords: Iterated Belief Contraction, natural revision, factoring
Joint work of: Ramachanrdran, Raghav; Nayak, Abhaya; Orgun,Mehmet
Belief in the Opponents' Future Rationality
Andres Perea (Maastricht University, NL)
In this paper we focus on dynamic games with almost perfect information, that
is, at every stage some players (possibly one) make a choice simultaneously,
and these choices become known to everyone before the next stage starts. We
introduce the idea of common belief in future rationality, which states that a
player always believes that his opponents will choose rationally in the present
and in the future, that a player always believes that every opponent always
believes that each of his opponents will choose rationally in the present and
in the future, and so on. We present an easy elimination procedure, backwards
dominance, that selects exactly those strategies that can rationally be chosen
under common belief in future rationality. This procedure can be viewed as a
combination of backwards induction and iterated strict dominance. We ﬁnally
relate the concept to other rationality concepts in the literature.
Keywords: Epistemic game theory, dynamic games, belief in future rationality,
algorithms
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Distances, structured proﬁles and Arrow's Theorem
Ramon Pino-Perez (Univ. de Los Andes - Merida, VE)
We study preferences which are structured by a distance d. With the help of
d, many functions can be deﬁned for which the input is a pair formed by an
alternative and a set of alternatives. We shall call these functions distances"
between an alternative and a set of alternatives. The usual way to construct these
distances is via an aggregation function. These distances allow the construction
of structured preferences and then structured proﬁles.
We propose a natural condition on these distances called richness property,
which allows us to prove Arrow's Theorem for the class of proﬁles structured
by distances satisfying the condition. Then we study two distances dmin and dσ
when d is the Hamming distance. We prove that dσ satisﬁes the richness property
but dmin does not.
Keywords: Social Choice Theory, Arrow's Theorem, distances, structured pro-
ﬁles, aggregation functions
Joint work of: Pino-Perez, Ramon; Salcedo, Dubraska
Similarity-based enlarging of statements for coping with
inconsistency. Part 1: Motivations and general principle
Henri Prade (Université Paul Sabatier (IRIT) - Toulouse, FR)
The inconsistency between pieces of information provided by diﬀerent sources,
or by diﬀerent agents, may be often due to uncertainty in meaning rather than
to the presence of information that would be "really" false. Then it may appear
more natural for restoring consistency to allow for a more permissive under-
standing of propositions rather than to ignore some propositions that would be
less entrenched. The presentation, in two parts, discusses this idea.
Part 1. Motivations and general principle (Henri Prade and Steven Schock-
aert)
The fact that uncertainty in meaning, or if we prefer 'vagueness', is per-
vading social interaction has been recognized early in AI (by Wahlster and his
co-workers). It may be even intentionally used in, e.g., bargaining dialogues. The
presentation ﬁrst brieﬂy discusses the interest of similarity-based enlargements of
propositions in approximate reasoning and in belief revision, before introducing
the general principle on illustrative examples in information fusion.
Part 2. Merging multiple source information (Steven Schockaert and Henri
Prade)
The talk discusses a new approach to merging conﬂicting propositional knowl-
edge bases which builds on the idea that consistency can often be restored by
interpreting propositions in a ﬂexible way, thus enlarging their sets of models.
We explore this idea ﬁrst at the semantic level, contrasting diﬀerent views, and
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subsequently illustrate how a syntactic counterpart can be implemented using
possibilistic logic.
Joint work of: Prade, Henri; Schockaert, Steven
On the Semantics of Multiple Contraction
Mauricio Reis (University of Madeira - Funchal, PT)
We present the possible worlds semantics for multiple contraction and propose
two new multiple contraction operations which generalize (to the multiple con-
traction case) the spheres' system-based (singleton) contraction (Grove 1988)
and the epistemic entrenchment-based (singleton) contraction (Gärdenfors and
Makinsson 1988).
Joint work of: Reis, Mauricio; Ferme, Eduardo
The Ramsey Test for Conditionals and Iterated Theory
Change
Hans Rott (Univ. of Regensburg, DE)
According to the Ramsey Test, conditionals reﬂect changes of beliefs:
A>B is accepted in a belief state *D* iﬀ B is accepted in the minimal revision
of *D* necessary to accommodate A. More than 20 years ago, the Ramsey test
came under heavy attack. A series of impossibility theorems ("triviality theo-
rems") seemed to show that given standard models of theory change, the Ramsey
test cannot serve as a viable analysis of conditionals. Other authors have come
to its defence, arguing that it is rather the standard AGM-type model of theory
change that is mistaken. In this talk I argue that an overly postulational ap-
proach to the semantics of (nested) conditionals should be avoided and that one
should instead turn to an analysis in terms of constructive models of (iterated)
theory change.
A crucial question is whether it is possible to use the Ramsey Test for the
interpretation of conditionals and still respect the Preservation Condition ac-
cording to which the original belief state *D* should be fully retained after a
revision by information that is consistent with *D*. Among the four most nat-
ural qualitative models for iterated belief change, I identify two solutions that
indeed allow us to combine the Ramsey test with Preservation in languages con-
taining only non-nested conditionals of the form A>B. These solutions, however,
violate Preservation for nested conditionals of the form A>(B>C). I argue that
by looking at the constructive models, we can understand why it has been wrong
to expect that Preservation holds in languages containing nested conditionals.
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How Mindless is Standard Economics Really?
Burkhard C. Schipper (Univ. of California at Davis, US)
Very Preliminary: Contrary to claims by Gul and Pesendorfer (2008) "The Case
for Mindless Economics I show that standard economics makes use of non-
choice evidence in a meaningful way. This is because standard economics solely
grounded in the theory of choice is "incomplete in the sense that it has content
that can not be revealed with any eﬀective choice procedure.
Prioritized and Non-prioritized Multiple Change on Belief
Bases
Guillermo Simari (Universidad Nacional del Sur - Bahia Blanca, AR)
In this article we explore multiple change operators, that is, operators in which
the epistemic input is a set of sentences instead of a single sentence. We propose
two types of change: prioritized change, in which the input set is fully accepted,
and symmetric change, in which both the epistemic state and the epistemic input
are equally treated. In both kinds of operators we propose a set of postulates
and we present diﬀerent constructions: kernel changes and partial meet changes.
Keywords: Belief Revision, Knowledge Dynamics, Multiple Change, Belief
Bases.
Joint work of: Falappa, Marcelo; Kern-Isberner, Gabriele; Reis, Mauricio;
Simari, Guillermo
Argument Theory Change Applied to Defeasible Logic
Programming
Guillermo Simari (Universidad Nacional del Sur - Bahia Blanca, AR)
In this article we work on certain aspects of the belief change theory in order to
make them suitable for argumentation systems.
This approach is based on Defeasible Logic Programming as the argumen-
tation formalism from which we ground the deﬁnitions. The objective of our
proposal is to deﬁne an argument revision operator that inserts a new argu-
ment into a defeasible logic program in such a way that this argument ends up
undefeated after the revision, thus warranting its conclusion.
In order to ensure this warrant, the defeasible logic program has to be changed
in concordance with a minimal change principle. Finally, we present an algorithm
that implements the argument revision operation.
Keywords: Belief Revision, Defeasible Logic Programming
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Joint work of: Moguillansky, Martin; Rotstein, Nicolás; Falappa, Marcelo;
Garcia, Alejandro; Simari, Guillermo
See also: Twenty- Third Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence, AAAI2008: 132-
137, Chicago, Illinois, USA, July 2008.
Awareness and forgetting of facts and agents
Hans Van Ditmarsch (University of Sevilla, ES)
We propose various logical semantics for change of awareness. The setting is that
of multiple agents that may become aware of facts or other agents, or forget
about them. We model these dynamics by quantifying over propositional vari-
ables and agent variables, in a multi-agent epistemic language with awareness
operators, employing a notion of bisimulation with a clause for `same awareness'.
The quantiﬁcation is over all diﬀerent ways in which an agent can become aware
(or forget). Logics for change of awareness combine well with logics for informa-
tional change, as when a public announcement simultaneously makes you aware
of an issue (`a plane just crashed on Schiphol Airport').
Keywords: Awareness, knowledge, multi-agent systems, dynamics
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/2228
Inclusion and Recovery in Belief Base Dynamics
Renata Wassermann (University of Sao Paolo, BR)
When contracting a formula from a belief base, two desiderata compete: one
wants to avoid including any new belief in the process (inclusion) but may want
to be able to recover information that was in the base before the contraction
took place (recovery).
The AGM paradigm imposes both constraints on contraction operations.
However, for ﬁnite belief bases inclusion and recovery cannot be simultaneously
satisﬁed.
In this paper, we examine constructions that weaken the inclusion constraint
and retain some form of recovery. We show that depending on what is allowed
to be added, we obtain a counterpart to the principle of minimal change, where
we add just enough information to allow recovery.
Keywords: Belief Revision, Rationality postulates
Belief Revision with Bounded Treewidth
Stefan Woltran (TU Wien, AT)
Problems arising from the revision of propositional knowledge bases have been
intensively studied for two decades.
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Many diﬀerent approaches to revision have thus been suggested, with the
ones by Dalal or Satoh being two of the most fundamental ones. As is well
known, most computational tasks in this area are intractable.
Therefore, in practical applications, one requires suﬃcient conditions under
which revision problems become eﬃciently solvable.
In this talk, we present such tractable fragments exploiting the notion of
treewidth. More speciﬁcally, we present a new algorithm based on dynamic pro-
gramming for problems in Dalal's setting and a tractability proof using Cour-
celle's Theorem for Satoh's approach.
The paper has been published in the Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference on Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning (LPNMR'09),




Leon van der Torre (University of Luxembourg, LU)
AGM theory change was developed as a formal framework for norm change, but
its restriction to propositional theories does not make it suitable for conditional
norms. In this talk we discuss a framework for norm change, and we present
some results for contraction of conditional norms.
Keywords: Normative systems, deontic logic, norm change
Joint work of: Boella, Guido; Pigozzi, Gabriella; van der Torre, Leendert
